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Fraudulent Evidmu Bifore Public fntenuztional 
Tribunals: The Dirt] Stories of /memational 
Law. By W. Michael Reisman and Christina 
Skinner. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge 
Universicy Press, 20 I 4. Pp. x, 222. Index. $90. 
Incernational law scholarship frequently cen-
ters on big-picrure theoretical and conceprual 
questions. Scholarly debates asking "Is imerna-
tionallaw law?" were all the rage some decades 
ago,1 while now much ink is spilJed on the frag-
mentation (or pluralism) ofincernauonallaw, 2 the 
rise of rhe individual in inremarional law;' and 
renewed debates pitting realism aga.insr idealism,4 
1 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW 
AND FOREIGN POLICY 88-98 (2d ed. 1979); HANS 
KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL REIJ\-
TIONS 1, 52, 54-55 (1942); GEORGE F. KENNAN, 
AMERICAN 011'L0MACY 1900-1950, at 95-103 (rev. 
cd. 1984); Anthony D'Amato, Is International LAw 
ReaDy ·LAw'?, 79 Nw. U. L REv. 1293 (1985). 
2 Gerhasd Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuingftom Frag-
memation of /numational Lnw, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 
849, 856-58 (2004); Mami Koskenniemi & Paivi 
Leino, Fragmmtation oflnumarional LAw! Posrmodem 
Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 553 (2002). In recent 
years, scholarly debates about pluralism have extended 
ro rhe sublield of inrernarional criminal law. Su, e.g., 
Elies van Sliedregt & Sergey Vasiliev, Pluralism: A New 
Fram~ork for /numational Crimi11al justice, in 
PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3, 
10-11 (Elies van Sliedregr & Sergey Vasiliev eds., 
20 14); Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, The Pluralism of 
lnrmzational Criminal Law, 861ND. LJ. 1063, 1069 
(2011). 
J KATE PARLETIE, THE INDIVliDUAL IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGALSYSTE..\4: CONTINUtn' AND 
CHANCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (201 I); Andrew 
Clapham, The Role of the Individual in lmemntionaL 
LAw, 2 1 EUR. ). INT'L L. 2S (20 1 0). 
4 Su, e.g., }ENS DAVID OHLIN, THE ASSAULT ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (20 15); ERIC A. POSNER & 
ADRlAN VERMEULE, THE ExECUTIVE UNBOUND: 
among other lofty topics. Although these and 
other clteoreticaJ dialogues have been insrrumemal 
in advancing international law conceptually as 
weU as pracdcaJJy, they can inadvertendy crowd 
our more commonplace issues that can have an 
equal or greater iimpacron internationallawand its 
development. One of these more mundane, yet 
vitally important, concerns is the subject of a new 
book, Fraudulmt Evitknce Befort Public Interna-
tional Tribunals: The Dirt] Stories of International 
Law, written by W. Michael Reisman, che Myres 
S. McDougal Professor ofl nrernational Law at che 
Yale Law School, and Christina Skinner, an Asso-
ciate in Law at Columbia Law School. 
Frauduknt Evidtnct Befort Public international 
Tribunals, as its name suggesrs, details a series of 
cases in which litigants presented false, forged, or 
otherwise misrepresentative evidence ro interna-
tional courts and tribunals. Each chapter presents 
acasesrudy (seven in aU), with the lirsrdatingfrom 
World War I and the last concluding in 2001. 
Whereas some of the case studies had already been 
well treated in the scholarly literarure,5 orherswere 
virruaiJy unknown before the publication of chis 
book.6 Moreover, even those cases that had 
AITER THE MADISON IAN REPUBLIC (20l0); ERICA. 
POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM (2009); 
ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR lN 
THE BAlANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE 
COURTS (200n; jACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. 
POSNER, THE LiMITS OF INTERNATIONAL lAW 
(2005); jOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND 
PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AITER 9111 (2005). 
5 For instance, the Sabotage cases, which ase detailed 
in chapter 2, formed the subject of a number of law 
review articles an.d book sections. Su, e.g., Timothy G. 
Nelson, The Explosion and the Tmimony: The WWJ Sab-
otage Claims and an lnttrnazional Arbitral Tribunal's 
Power to Revise Its Own Awards, 23 AM. REv. INT'L 
ARB. 197 (2012); L. H. Woolsey, TheArbitrationofthe 
Sabotage Claims Against Germany, 33 AJIL 737 (I 939); 
HENRY LANDAU, THE ENEMY WITHIN: THE INSIDE 
STORY OF GERMAN SABOTAGE IN AMERICA (193n; 
3 J. Grws WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBI-
TRAL PROCESS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 302-06 
(1979). Shabtai Rosenne deemed the Sabotagt cases a 
"weU-known instance of collusive or fraudulent evi-
dence before an international tribunal." ROSENNE'S 
THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT 
WORKS 253 n.23 (Terry D. Gill c:d.,6th rev. ed. 2003). 
6 I have seen very little scholarly discussion of the mis-
representations :at issue in the boundary dispute 
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received a reasonable amount of scholarly am~n­
tion are discussed far more expansively in this 
book. For example, although several law review 
arricles and books summarily describe the forged 
documents that Qatar submiued to the Interna-
tional Courr of Justice (ICJ) during its boundary 
dispute wirh Bahrain,7 Fraudltklll Evidence Before 
Public lntunational Tribunals examines the forg-
eries in scrupulous---and interesting-derail.8 
Indeed, rhe aurhors' careful and comprehensive 
detailing of the various cases probably stands as the 
book's most notable fearure. And beyond such 
detailing, rhe aurhors also include a substantial 
quantity of background and contextual material 
that makes rhe book both informative and acces-
sible. Some of the imernational disputes in ques-
tion occurred many decades ago, so readers may 
not be entirely familiar wirh them. The back-
ground materials that the amhors include, how-
ever, help to situate each conAict in its rc:levant 
geopolitical and legal comext. That said, at times 
rhe book's descriptions are so richly detailed chat 
readers must take care not to lose the forest for the 
trees. But overall rhe book's most significant con-
rribution likely lies in irs careful documentation of 
a series of otherwise unrelated cases in which rhe 
presentation of fraudulent evidence not only 
impaired rhe relevant international court's ability 
berwcen Libya and Tunisia before the International 
Court of] ustice that forms the subject of chapter 4. The 
following sources contain brief mentions of the C3Se: 
Robin GeiB, R(llision Promdings &fort.!llf lnr"!'a-
tional Coun ofjusticc, 63 ZEJTSCHR!Fi FUR AysLAN-
OISCHES 0FFEN11JCHES RECHT UNO VOLKER-
RECHT 167-68, 175, 179, 184-85, 187, 189 (2003); 
Jean-Pierre Cot, FraudontiJe Tribmml?,in l.AWOFTHE 
SEA FROM GROTIUS TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRI-
BUNAL OF THE L\W OF THE SEA 597, 599 (Uiian del 
CastiUo ed., 2015). 
7 KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLmCS, RIGHTS 
172-76 (20 14); ARMAN SARV AR.IAN, PROFESSIONAL. 
ETHICS AT THE INTERNATIONAL BAR 104-05 
(20 13); Geoffrey MarSton, Falsifiration ofD()('lmzmtary 
Evidmu &fore lnumntio1111l T ribun11ls: An Asp<ct oftlx 
&hring St4 Arbitration, 1892-3, 2000 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT'L L 357, 357-58. 
8 The only work that I could find that providesasim· 
ilarly detailed look at Qatar's forged documems is 
]A WAD SALIM AL-ARA YEO, A LTNE IN THE SEA: TH£ 
QATAR V. BAHRAIN BORDER DISPIJTE IN THE 
WORLD COURT 355-92 (2003). 
to find accurate F.tcrs but also forced the coun ro 
grapple with a host of difficult questions. The dis-
covery of fraudulent evidence in some cases, for 
instance, required courtS to balance carefully rhe 
interests of finality against rhe interests of aocu-
racy.9 Allegations of fraudulent evidence in or her 
cases led couru ro employ evidentiary devices such 
as presumptions, burden shifts, and adverse infer-
ences, which can serve to deter or encourage the 
presentation of fraudulent evidence depending on 
how chey arc used (pp. 104- 17). Finally, cases in 
which government lawyers were asked co submit 
questionable evidence or advance misrepresernta· 
tive argumcn rs for the good of rhe nation show-
cased rhe dash between sovereignty and profes· 
sional ethics that can occur in international 
litigation. 10 
The autho·rs advance certain conclusions about 
these issues as they rc:lare to rhe case srudies in 
question. For instance, they criticize the lr:an· 
United States Claims Tribunal for irs "marked dis-
inclination" 1(0 publicly call our fraudulent evi-
dence for wlm ir is (p. 125). In addition, they 
critically observe that the Tribunal's use of infer-
ences, presumptions, and evidentiary burdens, 
though reasonable on irs fuce,led the Tribunal to 
impose "no sanctions for the use of fraudulent evi-
dence" (pp. 125-26). The authors also put fonh 
some preliminary views on the questions of profes-
sional responsibility raised by fraudulent evidence. 
They argue, in part, chat, in an international case, 
9 The ease :studies suggest that different tribunals 
ascribe vastly different weights tO finality. The U.S.· 
Mexican Claims Commission of the mid-nineteenth 
century, for instance, "show(ed) great reverence for 
finaliryofinternationaJ awards" (p. I O).lt consequently 
rejected Mexico's request for a rehearing based on 
new evidence because it assumed "that the adminis· 
tradve consequences of allowing the reopening of 
awards would undermine rhe enrire decisional pro-
cess" (pp. I 0 - II ). By contrast, the German-U.S. 
Mixed Claims Commission did nor hesitate to 
reopen the Sabotage cases based on American allega-
tions of fraud (pp. 32-33). Some years later, another 
arbi tral tribunal-the Iran-United States Claims Tri· 
bunal-cxhibited a reluctance to reopen cases on the 
basis offraud rhat was reminiscent of the U.S.-Mex-
ican Claims Commission (pp. 117-23). 
10 The authors' description of the Corfo C!Jamul 
C3SC, Corfu Channel (UK v. Alb.), 1949 ICJ REP. 4 
(Apr. 9). highlights these tensions (pp. 54-77). 
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the burden of containing fraud should be borne by 
the counsel proffering the questionable evidence 
(p. 190). The authors recognize that placing the 
burden on the proffering counsel could give rise w 
significant practical difficulties, especially if it 
requires a lawyer to use experts to investigate his 
own client and the documents that the diem 
provides (id. ). They nonetheless conclude tbar 
because proffering counsel possess such superior 
informacion abour the evidence that they submit, 
they should bear the burden of satisfying them-
selves of the evidence's authenticity (id. ). The 
book ends with a seven-page conclusion in which 
the authors delineate the various difficulties thar 
render "practicable solutions to the problem of 
fraudulent evidence before public international 
tribunals ... elusive" (p. 193). 
Although the authors reached well-supported 
and interesting conclusions, through much of the 
book I found myself itching for more. In particu-
lar, I wished that the authors would do more syn-
thesizing of the various cases and would present 
more comprehensive and integrated normacive 
proposals. As noted, the authors do advance some 
normative conclusions, but they stop well short of 
promoting a particular thesis for how interna-
tional lawyers should approach questionable evi-
dence and how courtS that receive such evidence 
should respond. The authors are undoubtedly cor-
rect thar cenain fearures of international law and 
international adjudication, not to mention the 
impediments posed by global policies, make 
addressing fraudulent evidence in the interna-
tional context more fraught with difficulty than in 
the domestic context. Yet, my first reaction was to 
think that there must be some rules, policies, or 
strategies that international courts can usefully 
employ to address the problem of fraudulenr evi-
dence. 
By the end of the book, however, r came tO rec-
ognize that a desire foranythingresemblinga com-
prehensive solution is unrealistic. For one thing. 
the case srudies in the book feature a wide array 
of problematic evidence and arguments, including 
various forms of fraud, omissions, and misrepre-
sentations. In some cases, the dishonesty is evident 
and unquestionable; for example, the book 
describes the I C)'s Qatllr v. Bahrain case, which 
fearured eighry-two clearly forged documents.11 I 
term these documents "clearly forged" because 
they "were not only mysteriously absent from any 
archive besides the Diwan Amiri Archives in 
Doha, bur they were also riddled with historical 
anachronisms" (p. 180). T he documents included 
"letters written ro and from persons dead at the 
time of the alleged writing, leners writren to and 
from officials whose positions did nor exist, [and] 
letters written in Arabic between two English 
speakers-to name just a few examples of the fraud 
uncovered by [Bahrain's] experts" (it/.). Given the 
obviousness of the forgeries, it came as no surprise 
when Qatarquicklywithdrew the documentsaf,er 
Bahrain's experts questioned their authenticiry. 12 
In many o( the orher cases showcased in the 
book, however, the evidence featured more subtle 
and more contested difficulties. In rhe I C)'s C()n-
tinmtlll Sh~lfcase involving Libya and Tunisia, for 
example, Libya submitted documents and made 
arguments that strongly implied an erroneous 
(and favorable) boundary for Libya's oil conces-
sion (pp. 79-80, 89). The documents rhac Libya 
submined were accurate as far as they went, bur 
they did not delineate the concession's coordi-
nates, and Libya failed to submit related docu-
ments that did (pp. 84-85}. Two years after the 
ICJ issued its judgment, Tunisia learned of the 
concession's ac[Ual coordinates, and it asked 
the ICJ to revise irs judgment accordingly." In 
addressing T unisia's request, lhe ICJ bypassed any 
consideration of the improprieryoflibya's behav-
ior. instead, it concerned itself with Tunisia, find-
ing that revision was nor appropriate under rhe 
ICJ Rules of Court because Tunisia had it~elf 
failed to ascercain rhe coordinates of the conces-
sion, alrhough that information was available to 
11 Maricime Delimitation and Territorial Quescions 
Berween Qatar and Bahrain (Qacarv. Bahr.), 2001 1C} 
REP. 40, paras. 18,20 (Mar. 16) (hereinafter Maritime 
Delimitarion).The book also describes plainly forged 
documenu submined to the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal, as well as to the U.S.-Mcxican Claims Com-
mission (pp. 9-12, 104-17). 
12 Maricime Delimitation, supra noce II, para. 20. 
u Applicario n for Revision and I nterpreration of r he 
Judgment of24 February 1982 in the Case Concerning 
the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jama· 
hiriya) (Tunis. v. Libya), 1985 ICJ REP. 192, para. 6 
(Dec. 10). 
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it .14 Whether or nor one agrees with that holding, 
no one would deny that Libya's failure to submit 
relevant evidence (that had not been requested) 
srands as a lesser form of wrongdoing-if it even 
should be considered wrongdoing at all-than 
Qatar's submission of dozens of dearly forged 
and fabricated documents. Consequently, couns 
muse craft different responses for different types of 
(mis)behaviors. 
Further, it is not only the fact that questionable 
evidence comes in many different sizes and Aavors 
that complicates the desirabiliry-indced, the 
feasibility-of potential remedial options. Vari-
ous facts about the imemational courtS also 
become relevant when determining the appropri-
ate response to fraudulenr evidence. In particular, 
courtS that boast greater longevity, prestige, 
resources, and polirical independence, to name a 
few factors, may be bener able to develop rules 
designed to punish, and thereby deter, the submis-
sion of fraudulent evidence chan courts that arc 
temporary, ad hoc, or dependent in some way on 
any of the state litigants. or course, this insight 
is hardly limited to the development of rules 
responding to fraudulent evidence. Everyone 
understood, for instance, that when the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
abruptly reversed irsdfin the Barayagwizn case, it 
did so because Rwanda's extraordinarily negative 
reacrion to the dismissal ofBarayagwiza's indict-
ment seriously impaired the ICfR's :tbiliry to 
function.•s Similarly, Iran's w;ldly negative 
response to the Iran-United States Claims Tribu-
14 /d., pans. 25-28. 
1 ~ The JCrRAppealsChamber initially dismissed with 
prejudice the indictment :lgllinst Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza 
and ordered him rdeascd after determining tlut the pros-
ecution had violated Barayagwiza's right to be brought 
prompdy bcfo~ a judge following arrest. Prosecutor v. 
B:myagwiza, Case No. JCfR-97-19-AR72, Motion for 
Orders to Review and/or Nullify Arrest and Provisional 
Detention, para. 119 (Nov. 3, 1999). This decision 
outraged Rwanda to such a degree that it suspended 
all dealings with the lCfR and refused to issue a visa 
to the Tribunal's chief prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte. 
The prosecution consequently asked the Appeals 
Chamber to reconsider its decision and, in doing so, 
acknowledged Rwanda's power over che Tribunal. In 
particular, Del Ponte observed: "If I don't get coop-
eration from Rwanda, ... I can first open rhe door at 
the detention center and set rhem all free and then 
nal's decision accepting jurisdiction over the 
daims of Iranian-American dual narional.s16 led 
the Tribunal to suspend operations entirely for a 
few months, 17 .and put the cases of dual nationals 
on hold for even longer, in order to" give I ran time 
to overcome irs anger."18 In shorr, anyone who has 
worked at an imernacional court knows that the 
development of any rule. policy, or practice takes 
place against a background of concern about the 
state response ro that rule, policy, or practice. 
Whereas domestic lawmakers concerned about 
fraudulent evidence need consider only which 
policy is mostly like to advance the lawmakers' 
goals, international lawmakers must consider that 
dynamic, plus a multitude of ocher factors relating 
to the court's power and inAuence in the context 
in which it operates. Pur bluntly, it does not matter 
which course is theoretically best for addressing 
second I an close thedoorto myofficcbecausewith-
out them I cannot do anything all.• J. Coli Metcalfe, 
Anlnrrrvirw wi1IJ Unitrd Nntiom' Chir[Wnr Crimrs 
Prosmuor, Cnrln Dr/ Ponrr, lNTERNEWS, Feb. 15, 
2000, at hrrps://web.archive.org/web/200 1 () 124093400/ 
http://www.inte.rnews.org/aetivities/ICTR_repons/ 
lCfRDelPonte.htm. Following Del Ponte's plea, the 
Appeals Chamber ~instated Barayagwiz.a's indictment, 
and relations between the I erR and Rwanda normalized. 
Prosccutorv. Bar.ayagwiza, Case No. ICfR-97-19-AR72. 
Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Review or Rcam-
sidcr.uion (Mar. 31. 2000). Foran insider's :ux:ounc of the 
crisis, sec KINGSLEY MOCHALU, RWANDA'S GENO-
CIDE: THE POLITICS OF GLOBAl. jUSTICE 101-23 
(2005). 
Rwanda also responded very negatively co Del 
Ponte's efforts to investigate members of the current 
Rwandan government. ~t Syntlmis: Prostroton nt tht 
ICTR, ARUSHA TIMES, Oct. 30, 2003, at http://www. 
arushatimes.co.tz:/2003/43/un_tribunal.htm (reprint of 
Hironddle News Agency story); MOGHALU, n1prn, at 
140. After Del Pome was replaced as prosecutor by Hassan 
Jallow, no further investigations were undertaken. VIC-
TOR PESKIN, lm-ERNATIONAL]USTICE IN RWANDA 
ANDTHEBALJ<A.NS: VIRTUAl. TRIALSANDTHESTRUG-
GLE FOR STATE. COOPERATION 225 (2008). 
16 GEORGE H. ALDRICH, THE jURISPRUDENCE OF 
THE IRAN-UNITED STATES C~IMS TRIBUNAL: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE DECISIONS OF THE TRIBUNAL )8 
(1996). 
17 /d. 3[ 26. 
18 Among other things, Iran threatened to boycott 
any session involving the claims of dual nationals. !d. at 
57-58. What is more, this ruling and certain others so 
upset two Iranian arbitrators that they physie<tlly 
attacked a Swedish arbitratOr, Nils Mangtrd. !d. at 
24-27. 
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fraudulent evidence ar an international court if 
rhar best course will be ignored or will impair the 
coun's abilicy ro carry our irs mission. 
Complicating remedial issues funher are rhe 
difficulties of proof rhar arrend allegations of 
fraud. Such difficulties are highlighted in the 
book's discussion in chapter 5 of the I C)'s Nicara-
gua v. United States case. 19 A key question there 
was whether Nicaragua had been supplying arms 
to El Salvadorian insurgents. Although Nicaragua 
acknowledged chat some arms might have entered 
El Salvador from Nicaragua, ir maintained that 
any such shipments were small in number, and it 
Aady denied that Nicaragua "had a policy of send-
ing arms to opposition forces in Central America" 
(p. 91).20 The ICJ accepted Nicaragua's denial,21 
Stephen Schwebel, the U.S. judge ac the ICJ, vig-
orously dissented, 22 and there the matter reseed 
umil 1993, when a cache ofNicaraguan arms held 
by Salvadorean rebels was discovered. Many con-
sidered this discovery to prove chat Nicaragua had 
lied to the court. For instance, Robert Turner 
opined that "[w]hacever confusion might have 
existed a decade ago on this issue, the facts are now 
dear. The Sandinistas deceived most of the judges 
on the World Court and a lor of other people as 
weU."23 Shabtai Rosenne concurred, concluding 
that the discovery of the cache "oonfirmed faces 
19 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986IC) REP. 14 (June27). 
20 See also id., para. 134. 
2 1 The Court found that "in the early months of 
198 I, an imermirrcnr Aow of arms was routed via the 
terriroryofNicaragua ro the armed opposition in El Sal-
vador." !d., para. 160. However it also concluded that 
"the evidence is insufficient to satisfy the Court that, 
since the early momhs of1981, assistance has continued 
to reach Salvadorian armed opposition from the terri-
tory of Nicaragua on any significant scale, or that the 
Governmem ofNicaragua was responsible for any Aow 
of :arms ar either period." !d. 
22 judge Schwebel opined that Nicaragua's allega-
tions regarding its alleged supply of arms to El Salvador 
were "demonstrably false," and he included a long fac-
rual appendix that included evidence co support hiscon-
clusions./d., Diss. Op. Schwebel, J., para. 25. 
23 Robert F. Turner, Co~rdve Covert Action and the 
Law, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 427, 439 (1995) (reviewing 
W. MICHAEL REISMAN & jAMES E. BAKER, REGU-
u\TING COVERT ACTION: PRACTICES, CONTEXTS, 
AND POLICLES OF COVERT COERCION ABROAD IN 
INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN lAW (1992)). 
elucidated by judge Schwebel in his questioning 
from the Bench."24 Indeed, in 2012, Judge 
Schwebel himself published a lerrer in the Ameri-
can journal oflnurnational Law in which he main-
tained that the discovery of the arms cache "should 
have been the profound embarrassment of rhe 
Coun" because it "proved that the affidavit of the 
Nicaraguan foreign minister was false and that 
the Sandinisra government of Nicaragua grossly 
misled rhe Courr."25 However, even after the dis-
covery, no consensus was reached. Counsel for 
Nicaragua, Paul Reichler, rejected Judge Schwe-
bel's conclusions, arguing that "[t]he presence of 
arms in Nicaragua in 1993 does not constitute evi-
dence that the government of Nicaragua was traf-
ficking them to El Salvador seven or more years 
earlier. "26 In short, Nicaragua v. United States did 
lirde to reveal whether Nicaragua supplied arms to 
El Salvador, but it did make clear that remedial 
options become relevant only after fraud has been 
adequately proved. More to rhe point, allegations 
of fraud raise difficult standard-of-proof questions 
that any normative theory would also have to 
address. 
Indeed, although I wanted Fraudulent Evidence 
Before Public lnumational Tribunals to provide 
more answers, my own research on fraudulent 
evidence in the narrower realm of international 
criminal law provides compelling evidence char 
I was unlikely to receive them. My book, Fact-
Finding Without FactS: The Uncertain Evidentiary 
Foundatiom of International Criminal Convictiom, 
considered fact-finding impediments of all sons in 
international criminal trials, and it focused con-
siderable specific arrention on false testimony.27 
24 SHASTA! ROSENNE, TH£WORLDCOURT: WHAT 
IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 153 (5th rev. ed. 1995). 
25 Stephen M. Schwebel, Cekbrating a Fraud on the 
Court, I 06 AJIL I 02, I 03 (20 12). 
26 Paul$. Reiclller, Th~ Nicaragua Case: A Rerporuao 
judgeSchwtbt/, 106 AJIL 316,319 (2012). 
27 NANCY AMOURY COMBS, FACT-FINDING 
WITHOUT FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY 
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRJMJNAL 
CONVICTIONS (2010), reviewed at 105 A]IL 848 
(2011) by Linda A. Malone. 
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My research revealed. in particular, that false tes-
timony was pervasive at least at some of che inter-
national criminal tribunals,28 and ir identified 
several possible causes of the false tescimony.29 
However, whereas documenting me incidence of 
false testimony and speculating about irs causes are 
relatively straightforward, determining how to 
reduce it is nothing of the sort. Certainly, I 
advanced various proposals to achieve such a 
reduction, from sending judges on on-site visits,30 
to dramatically increasing perjury prosecucions,)1 
to employing modc:S ofliabili ry that minimize the 
need for eyewitness testimony.31 !But although [ 
would like to think that l supported these propos-
als with convincing argumentation, I nonetheless 
recognize that plausible arguments can be mar-
shalled both aga.inst the specific proposals them-
selves as well as against what might be considered 
an undue focus on the prevention of false testi-
mony . .B Whether addressing fals~ testimony in 
me narrow realm ofinternational criminal law or 
18 For instance, I determined thar 92% of cases ar the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda featured at 
feast one example of diametrically opposed testimony 
berween rwo or more witnesses, such that the testimony 
of one of the witnesses was n«essarily inaccurate. 
I acknowledged that the high incidenceofblacantlycon-
rradicrory testimony stood as an imperfect measure of 
perjury given that some of the contradictions likely 
rdlcetcd the witnesses' mistaken memories or percc:p-
cions, rather than their willfully false testimony. How-
ever, I concluded that because the contradictory testi-
mony was so prevalent, it would be naiVe co dismiss 
all-or even a significant proponion-as stemming 
from honest miStakes. !d. ac 157-62. 
l? I considered both culrural inAuences and financial 
incentives as possibly comribucing co che incidence of 
false testimony. !d. at 130-48. 
30 1<1. at 281-82. 
Jt /d. at 282-85. 
l2 /d. :u 321-33. 
J> During a presentation at which I advocated perjury 
prosecutions for those alleged to have provided willfull)· 
false testimony, a judge from one of the tribunals 
reminded me that every dollar spent co prosecute per-
jury was a dollar char could nor be spent to prosecute 
international crimes. Although I continue to believe 
that checosrsofignoringfalse testimony exceed the costs 
of combating ir, I must acknowledge that, in a world in 
which funds exist to prosecute only a miniscule propor-
tion of those who commit genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity, every diversion of resources is 
signifi<::~nt. 
considering all manner of fraudulent evidence in 
che broader realm chat Fraudulmt Evidmc~ Bifort' 
Public !ntmtational Tribunals canvasses, there are 
no easy answers. 
In short, ev·en to start to provide answers 
requires us to cau:gorize, classify, and consider a 
host of relevant factors relating to the kind of evi-
dence involved, the nature of the alleged wrongdo-
ing, the role occupied by the alleged wrongdoer, 
and the power and influence of the international 
court. In this realm, the devil truly is in the details. 
Although Frauduknt Evidmt~ Bifore Pub/it 
lntmtational Tribunals does not engage in the 
categorizing, classifying, and considering required 
to develop one or even a series of normative the-
ories to combat fraudulent evidence, it is ro be 
applauded for laying some groundwork and starr-
ing the dialogue:. 
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